This paper studies the causal factors that make the oil-state Venezuela, which is generally characterized by a low level of violence, an outlier among the oil countries as a whole. It applies a newly elaborated "context approach" that systematically considers domestic and international contextual factors. To test the results of the systematic analysis, two periods with a moderate increase in internal violence in Venezuela are subsequently analyzed, in the second part of the paper, from a comparative-historical perspective.
Introduction
In the academic literature, there appears to be a widespread consensus that natural resources have a negative impact on the development of the respective countries. Although partly divergent, the two central theoretical approaches focusing on this topic-the rentier state theory and the resource curse thesis-argue that the dependence of national economies on the export of natural resources causes massive political, economic and social distortions, provok-ing among other things an overproportionally high rate of various kinds of internal violence.
Of the different types of natural resources, oil is considered to particularly increase the likelihood of violence (Ross 2004; Humphreys 2005) .
In contrast, the oil-state Venezuela has, since democratization in 1958, been characterized by a remarkably low level of violence. Indeed, for a long time the country was one of the most stable and conflict-free democracies in Latin America-a fact that cannot be adequately explained by either the rentier state theory or the resource curse thesis. Hence, the first part of this paper analyzes the reasons for the low level of violence in the petrostate Venezuela since 1958 using an inductive-explorative approach that systematically takes crucial domestic and international contextual conditions into consideration.
The central question is, What are the contextual factors and specific causal mechanisms that make Venezuela an "outlier" among oil countries, broadly seen as being prone to either violent conflict or authoritarianism? Special emphasis is thereby placed on the issue of the precise direct and indirect impacts of oil or, more precisely, of the petroleum rents. 1
Even though the overall level of violence in Venezuela is low, there have been three historical periods with a moderate increase in internal violence. The first period was during the early days of democratic rule, when the country was temporarily shaken by the emergence of a guerilla movement. The second period was at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. The third period began in the year 2001 and has continued until today. Focusing on the last two phases, the second part of the paper will explore these periods using a diachronic comparative analysis. The study of the causal mechanisms which could help explain this increase in previously nonexistent violence includes the following central questions:
Which stabilizing or violence-reducing contextual conditions that existed previously have been weakened or nullified? In which specific way has the interplay of the causal mechanisms thus been altered? Again the focus is on oil and its precise influence on the tendencies described. Thus, the main hypothesis of this paper is that while the factor oil indeed has a decisive influence on the political and socioeconomic development of the country, the link between oil and the dependent variable violence is ambiguous and cannot be comprehensively clarified without considering the crucial influence of specific contextual conditions.
Before entering into the in-depth case study, a short overview of the academic debate on natural resources and their political and socioeconomic impact-presenting the latest findings as well as existing explanatory deficiencies-shall be provided. Subsequently, the sophisticated "context approach," which constitutes the framework for the following analysis of the Venezuelan case, will be introduced. 
Theoretical Framework

The Rentier State Theory and the Resource Curse Thesis
With regard to the political effects, the principal proposition of the rentier state theory is that (oil) rents -defined as "the excess over the return to capital, land, and labor when these factors of production are put their next best use" (Dunning 2008: 39) -have a stabilizing effect on authoritarian rule (Mahdavy 1970; Beblawi/ Luciani 1987; Ross 2001) . Initially based on empirical findings in the Middle East, the rentier state theory claims universal validity (Beck 2007: 44) .
The linkage between oil rents and authoritarianism is attributed to the following causal mechanisms: Firstly, it is presumed that oil rents foster the formation of stabilizing patronage networks, widespread clientelism, and assistentialist distribution policies, which in turn dampen the democratic pressure from the population and which may also result in the depoliticization of the society. Secondly, the abundance of revenues generated from the oil sector relieves national rulers of the need to tax the population. This again may disburden the political elite of demands from the population for political participation and accountability on the part of the elites. The rentier state theory does not focus primarily on violence, but rather on the stability of authoritarian rule. However, as authors such as Ross illustrate, resource wealth may make it easier for authoritarian rulers to use violence in the form of political repression because it helps in financing an extensive, oppressive state apparatus (Ross 2001) .
Within the last decade, another theoretical approach-the resource curse thesis-has progressively gained importance within the theoretical debate on natural resources. Some authors place special emphasis on the economic characteristics of resource-rich countries. They claim that resource wealth is linked to poor economic growth (Auty 1993; Sachs/ Warner 1995) and other economic problems such as Dutch disease and poor performance in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, fostering an insufficient degree of diversification and vulnerability towards external shocks. A further branch of the resource curse thesis focuses on the link between natural resources and violent conflicts (Collier/Hoeffler 2001; Le Billon; 2001; de Soysa 2000) . The central hypothesis-which is partly contradictory to the rentier state theory's assumptions-is that resource-dependent countries are more likely to undergo internal instability and violent conflicts than countries which are not depending on the export of resources.
The mechanisms assumed to be responsible for this linkage include the fact that natural resources can be the motive for violent conflicts. This means that parts of the population might feel deprived of the financial benefits of the resource revenues-while possibly suffering from the ecological and social impacts of production (according to Collier/Hoeffler 2001: mo- tive of grievance)-or that resource wealth can be the target of armed rebel activity with the objective of taking possession of the resource revenues (motive of greed). Furthermore, resource revenues can serve as a catalyst for violent conflicts by financing the rebel groups and other actors involved (opportunity; feasibility) and can thus have a prolonging effect on conflicts (Collier/Hoeffler 2004; Le Billon 2001) . Finally, resources and especially oil can also indirectly increase the likelihood of violent conflicts by weakening political institutions and/or by triggering socioeconomic decline. Authors such as Fearon and Latin argue that "oil producers tend to have weaker state apparatuses than one would expect given their level of income because the rulers have less need of a socially intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues" (Fearon/Laitin 2003: 16) .
A Differentiated Approach through the Inclusion of Contextual Conditions
Referring to the contradictory empirical results of econometric studies, deficient databases, and the existence of various outliers-resource countries like Botswana, Chile or Norway, which are stable democracies and economically prospering-more recent literature on the resource curse has partly questioned the alleged resources-violence link (Hegre/Sambanis 2006; Bulte/Brunnschweiler 2006; Di John 2007) . Several authors demand a further theoretical differentiation within the debate and suggest that the impact of certain contextual conditions is pivotal for the incidence or absence of the so-called resource curse. (Snyder/Bhavnani 2004; Boschini et al. 2004; Basedau 2005; Basedau/Lay 2007) . Some authors, such as Di John (2007) and Rosser (2006) , have underlined the potential relevance of external factors, "social forces,"
and historical aspects, without so far testing them in in-depth empirical studies. Consequently, there is still a shortage of systematic comparative studies analyzing the effects of a broader set of contextual factors on the predicted resource-violence link.
This paper, which is part of a more extensive research project with a comparative research design, 2 aims to respond to this research gap. In the context of the research project, a sophisticated matrix of central contextual factors concerning the potential relation between resources and violence has been elaborated. Taking into consideration the assumptions of the recent and more differentiated branches of the resource curse approach, the insights of the rentier state theory, and the general theoretical approaches of peace and conflict research (Imbusch 2005; Senghaas 2004; Hegre/Sambanis 2006) , this matrix encompasses the set of contextual factors presented in Table 1 .
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In addition to the study of the petrostate Venezuela, case studies of Algeria, Iran and Nigeria have been completed as part of this research project and will culminate in a comparative study of the respective findings. Internal resource-specific contextual conditions of potential impact are the type of resource (oil, diamonds, wood, etc.) as well as the location and technical manner of extraction, which can make a difference because of the varying absolute value of the resources and because of the particular requirements for extraction, processing, and distribution (Le Billon 2003; Ross 2003 Ross , 2004 (Basedau 2005: 25) . Moreover, resource-sector management can differ substantially; who receives the resource rents and how they are redistributed and spent (for example, broad redistribution versus deployment through quite restricted clientelistic channels) seems to be significant and can avoid or trigger violence. This latter aspect also includes the question of the transparency and effectiveness of the particular management process (Fjelde 2006; Luong/Weinthal 2006) .
External resource-specific conditions which should be taken into consideration include the international governance of the resource sector. This means the actors involved, especially multinational companies, as well as the existing regimes, which constitute the legal basis of transnational resource trading (Bannon/Collier 2003) . Another aspect is the international demand and customer structures. This obviously includes not only the dynamics of the international oil price (boom and bust cycles), but also potential international rivalry for the control of resources that could trigger international conflicts (Giordano et al. 2005; Humphreys 2005 ). Finally, the external use of the resource rents by the respective political elite, which can be cooperative, offensive or aggressive, determines the particular impact of natural resources.
The central internal non-resource-specific contextual condition is certainly the level and dynamics of socioeconomic development. This refers to the situation before the beginning of resource extraction, which determines the internal conflictivity of a country independently of the resources (Imbusch 2005) and may also influence the subsequent handling of the resources and the resource rents (Soares de Oliveira 2005). Furthermore, within the peace and conflict literature, ethnic or religious cleavages are generally considered to boost the probability of civil war (Fearon/Laitin 2003) . They can be further inflamed by struggles over the ownership and distribution of resources. The quality and performance of political institutions (efficiency and legitimacy) is of basic importance for the political stability of any given country. It is therefore logical that this applies to the question of conflictivity in resource-dependent countries as well. Moreover, the general performance of the political and economic institutions moulds the specific resource-management approach and thereby influences the level of violence and conflict (Boschini et al. 2004 ). Finally, the behavioral patterns of the elite as well as the strength and autonomy of the civil society can be relevant in triggering or avoiding violence.
External non-resource-specific conditions which potentially determine the level of violence include the economic and political interdependence of the respective country. It can be assumed that countries with little international economic integration can be considered to be more prone to violence than those characterized by strong and diversified economic interdependence. Furthermore, regional and international organizations can play an important role. A low density of international regulation increases the likelihood of international and also internal violence, while integration in a tight and effective network of international organizations might impede conflict (Zangl/Zürn 2004 In sum, the main assumptions of the context approach introduced here are that the influence of resource wealth on violence is limited and that the respective impact depends decisively on additional contextual conditions. Secondly, it is hypothesized that the more such negative resource-specific and non-resource-specific contextual conditions presented above are at work, the more probable violence is. Even so, it is not expected that the contextual conditions operate according to a simple, linear interplay.
The precise impact of the resource-specific and non-resource-specific contextual conditions from the above matrix with respect to the Venezuelan case will be analyzed in the following sections using an exploratory and comparative-historical perspective. The findings shall then, in a further step, be compared to the insights of the other case studies within the research project, and-as far as possible-generalizations shall be made. The principal purpose is to identify new findings for the academic debate on the general link between resources and violence and to differentiate the existing theories. In addition, the systematic comparative approach may also open up new, innovative perspectives in the study of Venezuela which may not be evident within cases studies taking an exclusively country-specific perspective.
Case Study of the Petrostate Venezuela
Oil production in Venezuela began in 1917, yet by 1925 oil production accounted for more than 50 percent of the country's national export revenues. Oil has remained the country's principal export product up to today. Venezuela owns the largest oil reserves of the American continent and is, together with Mexico, one of the two main oil-exporting countries of the Americas.
At first, the development of the country into a petrostate widely "complied" with the assumptions of the rentier state theory: the repressive dictatorship of General Juan Vicente Gómez (1908 Gómez ( -1935 and his successors was supported with the increasing oil rents. These rents helped in the establishment of a well-equipped, centralized army and other national political institutions, and in the realization of massive public works programs and clientelistic distribution policies. However, in 1945 the dictatorship was overturned and a democratization process began-boosted by the indirect effects of oil. 3 After a short interruption by another period of military rule (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) , the installation of a stable and quite peaceful democracy followed. Indeed, Venezuela was for a long time one of the most settled, nonviolent democracies in Latin America, 4 a fact which seriously challenges the classical theoretical approaches, which focus on the political and socioeconomic development of petrostates.
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One of the results of the initial oil boom was the decline of the agricultural sector, inducing amongst other things the rapid urbanization of the country in the 1940s and 1950s. This urbanization, combined with the expansion of the public sector, led to the formation of an urban middle class which demanded more political participation and spread democratic political ideas. A more sophisticated analysis of the influence of oil (and other causal factors) on the process of democratization in Venezuela is beyond the scope of this paper. Those interested in the topic are referred to Karl 1987 , Hein 1983 The country has been considered a "textbook democracy" in Latin America by several authors (compare:
Merkl 1981).
Contextual Factors and Causal Mechanisms Explaining the Low Level of Violence
Resource-specific Contextual Conditions
The following central explanatory resource-specific contextual conditions, and the associated causal mechanisms, have determined the comparably low level of violence in Venezuela.
Degree of Abundance
Venezuela is not only highly dependent on the export of oil, 5 it is also an oil-wealthy country in terms of income deriving from the oil sector. Due to its high level of oil production on the one hand and a rather small population on the other hand, 6 oil rents per capita are relatively high. In 1982, for example, Venezuela had oil revenues per capita of more than US$800, while the annual oil revenues per capita in Nigeria were less than US$160. Thus, the possibility of welfare distribution, which can have stabilizing socioeconomic and political effects, has been much higher in Venezuela. (Although in general high oil revenues per capita do not automatically imply that the resource rents are indeed distributed in a large-scale manner). ; 1936 -1945 1945 -1958 : 71 percent (ECLAC 1960 Until the 1990s Venezuela's population did not exceed 20 million. It is currently approximately 27 million. 
Resource Management
As mentioned above, high oil rent per capita does not automatically mean that the whole population benefits from the oil wealth. Nevertheless, in Venezuela the political elites actually used to distribute oil rents broadly. An important step was the nationalization of the oil industry in 1976. This nationalization (in combination with the rising oil price) caused a significant increase in state income, which was transferred at least partly through increased sociopolitical measures and other indirect methods such as an inflated state sector, high salaries in the public sector, import subsidies, and, increasingly, corruption. Public sector employment, for example, grew from 6.7 percent of the labor force in 1950 to 19.1 percent in 1971 and 24.4 percent in 1981 (Roberts 2003: 46-47) . Social spending increased significantly between 1970 and 1980 (García/Salvato 2006: 249) , and most medical services in Venezuela were free of charge until the 1980s (España 1989: 168) . In interaction with the fundamental condition of a relatively high level of per capita resource abundance, the resourcemanagement approach led to the satisfying of large parts of the population and the strength- The large-scale direct and indirect distribution of oil rents can furthermore be considered to be one of the reasons of the failure of the Venezuelan guerrilla movement in the 1960s. 7 The guerilleros could not find broad support or even acceptance within a population characterized by quite a high living standard.
Likewise, nowadays the large-scale distribution of oil rents is one of the central pillars of the Chávez government's political power, assuring satisfaction and loyalty towards the government from the poorer classes. 8 This redistribution is realized not only through official social spending (see Table 3 Further reasons include the relatively small and state-dependent worker's class, which impeded guerrillarecruitment; the anti-Communist military support of the United States; and later the splitting of the guerrillas as a result of the active reintegration of parts of the leftist groups into the political system (e.g., through the declaration of an amnesty for leftist militants) (Werz 1990 ). 
Location of the Resources: Demographics of the Oil-exploitation Region
There are demographic factors which obviously have an impact on the weak linkage between oil and violence in Venezuela. The main oil production has for a long time taken place in the area of Maracaibo Basin; nevertheless, there are significant oil reserves in other regions of the country. It can be assumed that this widespread allocation-in interaction with the specific characteristics of Venezuela's political system described below-decreases the probability of separatist conflicts that authors such as Le Billon (2001) often link to the existence of so-called "point resources" such as oil.
Even more important seems to be the fact that oil production takes place mainly in the very sparsely populated rain forest and the Orinoco Delta on the one hand and in the huge Lake Maracaibo on the other hand. In both cases, there are few inhabitants to be negatively affected by the side effects of oil production. This obviously does not mean that the oil production does not cause severe pollution; Lake Maracaibo is completely contaminated with oil.
Nevertheless, the probability of grievance-related conflicts and violence in the oil production areas like those in Ecuador or in the Niger Delta-where oil spills are directly destroying the livelihoods of the residents through the massive destruction of soil, the widespread dispersion of toxic materials, and the contamination of much of the water resources-is reduced.
External Actors, International Demand and Customer Structure
Venezuela exports approximately two-thirds of its oil to the United States. This means that about 11 to 15 percent of all US oil imports come from Venezuela. As a consequence of this high dependence, US -governments have generally been interested in seeing stable political conditions in Venezuela-at least to the extent that the regime is not violating US (oil) Venezuelan government that they would reduce oil production and demanded an intervention by the US government. However, as the oil companies were faced with the explosion of world oil prices and growing oil consumption within the United States, and as significant compensation was paid by the Venezuelan government, relations between the oil companies and the Venezuelan government remained harmonious, and the international oil companies at least indirectly supported subsequent governments.
Political Institutions: General Aspects of Efficiency and Legitimacy, and the Territorial Structure of the State
As mentioned above, the nature of the political system and the performance of its institutions before the beginning of resource extraction seems to be of importance when dealing with the specific effects of natural resources. Interestingly, before its "oil era" Venezuela was not made up of stable political institutions but was a highly decentralized country, characterized by the rule of regional caudillos and high-level internal conflicts. Not exclusively because of oil, but partly due to the emergence of the oil industry, the country experienced nation building and a rapid centralization of political power in the 1920s and 1930s. 10 Initially an authoritarian regime, Venezuela became a democracy in 1945 for a short while, and has been one continuously since 1958. Hence, when the sudden oil boom began in the 1970s, the country had relatively stable democratic institutions that enjoyed high legitimacy within the population and that were a favorable starting point for enduring stability.
According to the constitution of 1961, Venezuela is a federal state. In practice, however, the federal states (Estados) have had limited responsibilities and the presidential system has consisted of a highly centralized administration, especially with respect to financial resources (Rangel Guerrero 2008: 366) . The regional governments do not have independent tax revenues; furthermore, until 1989, when a decentralization process was begun-reluctantly-the governors of the federal states were appointed by the president and used to belong to the same political party as the central government. 
Political Institutions: The So-called Partidocracia System
An important contextual condition which includes institutional aspects as well as the behavioral patterns of the elites (see below) is the so-called partidocracia system (in the attempt at an English translation, Coppedge (1994) In practice, the partidocracia system was based not only on the aforementioned institutionalization and the consensus-oriented behavioral patterns of the elites, but also-and increasingly as the years went by-on clientelism and patronage networks. The main actors within these networks were the two principal parties, AD and COPEI, as well as the interest groups For a detailed analysis see also Karl 1987; Levine 1978. 12 A clearly double-edged measure was the 1959 guarantee of amnesty for the army for all human rights abuses committed during Pérez Jiménez's rule, which was meant to obtain the benevolence and cooperation of the military actors.
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Whose decisive role in national politics was underlined by the constitution of 1961.
lan Federation of Labor Unions ) (Roberts 2003: 47) . These close clientelistic networks led to, among other things, the creation of a hardly autonomous civil society in Venezuela (Werz 1984: 79) . Moreover, a certain political pressure was exercised by the political party leaders.
Deviations from the party line were immediately punished with exclusion from the party and deprivation of the associated benefits (Schultz 2002: 238) . Further, the political parties exerted influence on the allocation of staff in the upper and middle positions of the public administration. The various clientelistic structures had, at least initially, an additional stabilizing and conflict-reducing effect. In the long run they continuously reduced the efficiency of the political institutions and the public administration, which were marked by a growing waste of resources and excessive corruption (Boeckh 1997: 289 -302) .
A final aspect worth mentioning is that the partidocracia system was realized by excluding several leftist organizations, for example, the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV). While this exclusion helped to consolidate internal stabilization in the first years after democratic transition, it indirectly fostered the radicalization of some leftist groups and furthermore had long-term consequences for Venezuelan democracy. The latter will be analyzed in Section 3.3.
Relations between Identity Groups
In terms of religion, Venezuela is a homogenous country. Moreover, it is barely ethnically polarized in the sense of conflicting ethnic groups. More than 90 percent of the population is Catholic, and more than two-thirds of the population is made up of so-called mestizos, people who are descended from white, black, and indigenous people. 14 Consequently, ethnic identities have never played a significant role for the majority of the Venezuelans. Furthermore, although indigenous groups have been discriminated against in practice, 15 there has been a very limited conflict potential among these groups as they constitute less than two percent of the population and are widely scattered across remote areas of the country. In sum, there are no relevant ethnic, religious or regional cleavages (BTI 2003: 12) 
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This discrimination finds its expression, for example, in expulsion from traditional territories and deficiencies in guaranteeing de facto juridical and social equality.
Relations with Neighboring Countries and Regional and Great Powers: The US Influence
Ultimately, it can be assumed that certain international political relations and international cooperation have contributed to the low level of violence in Venezuela. This would for instance include the backing of the partidocracia system by US governments. Obviously, as was elaborated before, bilateral relations between the two countries are considerably influenced by oil, but the relations explicitly exceed this one dimension.
External support from the United States indeed began hesitantly: the US government of President Eisenhower did not support the process of democratization itself, as it had previously had cordial relations with the Venezuelan dictator, Pérez Jiménez, who was overthrown in 1958 (Rabe 1982: 126) . As a result, the first comments on the new democratic president Betancourt were quite reluctant. Nevertheless, the US endorsed him and the AD as the seemingly most reliable bulwark against a further expansion of Communism. After receiving "assurances from Betancourt that foreign investment would be respected" (Rabe 1982: 134) , the US government made up its mind and actively supported the new Venezuelan government. They particularly backed the Venezuelan regime at the beginning of the 1960s when guerrilla groups temporarily emerged in Venezuela and the US government feared a possible Cuban infiltration. Close security connections were established und substantial economic aid was given. Thus, "between 1961 and 1965, the United States supplied over $60 million in credits and grants for military equipment and training, twice the amount of military aid supplied during the 1950s" (Rabe 1982: 146) . While economic aid was significantly reduced in the second half of the 1960s, military aid remained important.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the (stabilizing) US influence in Venezuela decreased as the Venezuelan governments were increasingly consolidating their power themselves. Some controversial bilateral disputes regarding the increasing oil price and the international influence of OPEC, which was founded with the strong involvement of Venezuelan politicians, occurred.
Fundamentally, though, bilateral relations remained close and friendly until 1999.
Importance of Regional and International Organizations: The Organization of American States
Another external factor which has had-though to a lower degree-some conflict-and violence-reducing influence has been constituted by regional organizations such as the Organi- 
Contextual Conditions
To summarize, several contextual conditions and associated mechanisms have been found that, independent of the effect of oil, represent a favorable basis for the stable, nonviolent political development of Venezuela since 1958. These factors are the absence of relevant ethnic and religious cleavages; the territorial structure of the state; the behavioral patterns of the elite; and-largely independent from the factor oil-the initial foundation of the partidocracia system and a rather advanced nation-building process.
In many cases, however, these causal mechanisms have operated as part of a complex interaction between multiple non-resource-specific and resource-specific contextual conditions.
Oil has thus explicitly served as a conflict-reducing, stabilizing, and even democracypromoting factor, principally through the large-scale distribution of sociopolitical benefits, an oversized state sector, broader clientelistic structures, and corruption.
What is remarkable is the inherent dynamism of certain transmission channels (for example, the impact of clientelism and corruption). This results in the possibility of changing effects over different time periods, an aspect that will be revisited later on.
Especially in the 1960s, the stabilizing influence of the United States-which was highly interested not only in the oil business and oil imports but also in deterring a potential Communist expansion-was important. This influence began to decline in the 1970s.
Of some, but rather secondary, importance seems to be the level of violence in the region as a whole and the possible spillover effects linked to it. Although the Cuban revolution had some such effects, they were rather elusive and of minor intensity. While a lot of the Latin American neighboring countries have been affected by violence and military dictatorship, Venezuela remained fairly unaffected until the end of the 1980s.
Description of the Periods of a Moderate Increase in Violence
In spite of the overall low level of violence in Venezuela, there have been three periods which saw a relative increase in internal violence. The first occurred in the context of the emergence of an armed guerilla movement in the middle of the 1960s; it was nevertheless relatively rap- (Sullivan 2008: 9) and by providing an electoral observer mission during the recall referendum. two more recent periods, 18 the following discussion will identify those causal mechanisms that help to explain this increase in violence (or, put another way, will analyze which causal mechanisms had changed, so that the increase in violence can be understood). First, however, the different dimensions and levels of violence shall be outlined briefly:
The definition of violence used in this paper is a narrow one and is limited to physical violence. It includes internal violent conflicts and uprisings as well as violent state repression. The UCDP-PRIO considers armed conflicts with at least 25 battle-related deaths per year. 20 This Conflict Barometer proved to be quite beneficial in studying conflicts in Venezuela because it also includes low-level violent conflicts by using a qualitative definition of violence, differentiating between latent conflict, manifest nonviolent conflict, violent crisis (medium and severe) and war. For instance, in March 1991, when two students died in demonstrations, and in November 1991, when three people were killed in the context of protest marches.
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See UCDP-PRIO online data set; for the first coup attempt the estimates indicate 14 deaths.
Internal Conflicts and Repression since 2001
Since The second dimension of violence under President Chávez, which has recently been stressed by various critics of the Venezuelan leader, is political repression. Upon closer examination, however, it must be stated that only in particular cases (at least so far) has this repression been marked by violence in the sense of the specific use of physical force by actors of the government for political reasons. For instance, no torture for political reasons 25 is identifiable in Venezuela, and the death penalty has been abolished for all crimes. While there were hardly any political prisoners in the first years of Hugo Chávez's presidency, an increasing number of threats of imprisonment and arbitrary detentions of his political opponents have been observed in recent years. Furthermore, there have been some spectacular prosecutions of high-ranking political opponents for corruption, although the real background of the cases has not been clarified and is highly contested. Most cases of (political) repression are of an indirect type. Thus, on the one hand there is a general tendency towards an increase in auto- 24 This accusation has still not been entirely clarified. 25 Though torture by the police has been regularly reported in Amnesty International publications, under former governments as well as today, it is, as far as is determinable, not carried out for political reasons. The same goes for extrajudicial executions in Venezuela. ing, it must be added that not all human rights violations are carried out by the government and its supporters; they also result from a partly militant opposition and the problem of rising criminality in Venezuela.
Causal Mechanisms Explaining the Increase in Internal Violence
In order to answer the central questions regarding which mechanisms can explain the illustrated increase in violence and what oil has to do with these developments, the following sections will examine which stabilizing or conflict-reducing mechanisms that existed previously have been weakened or transformed.
Violence at the End of the 1980s and the Beginning of the 1990s.
Oil Abundance
The catalyst for the uprising of 1989 (Caracazo) was a dramatic increase in the price of gasoline and, in consequence, the prices for public transport. The unrest and spontaneous protests were joined by more and more discontented social and political groups. A central underlying cause of the uprising was the negative economic development of the country in the context of the collapse of the global oil price as of 1986 and the accompanying reduction in oil-export revenues ( Table 2 ). This reduction was later aggravated by the reduced governmen- tal share of total oil revenues due to a reform of national oil politics in 1989 (Mommer 2003: 29 
Resource Management and Economic Distortions
However, the negative economic tendencies had already begun in 1982, when the oil price was still relatively high. The devaluation of the overvalued national currency, the bolivar, in
February 1983 led to a continuous increase in inflation and food prices. Poverty, which in comparison to other Latin American countries had for a long time been quite low in Venezuela, rose sharply (Table 3) , as did unemployment and informal employment (Maingon 2006: 71) . The subsequent decline in the oil price-and, consequently, the decline of government revenues and public social spending (Table 3) -exacerbated an already existing downwards trend. The country had become the victim of a complex interaction of factors: significant Dutch disease effects, the increasingly inefficient squandering of government resources, and careless borrowing. The latter turned into a serious problem in the context of the increase in international interest rates, which in turn led to increased foreign debt. The situation was aggravated by the enormous flight of capital after 1983, which was caused by the rising economic uncertainty and deepened the vicious cycle (Schneider 1983: 1) . Since the dominance of the oil sector had led to the decline of the national agricultural sector, the country had to import the majority of the food needed for the domestic market (Morales Espinoza 2002). As long as the oil revenues were high, the negative consequences were hardly noticeable. But with the sharp decline of oil abundance, the poorer classes in particular were severely hit by high food prices.
Moreover, when Carlos Andrés Pérez was elected president in 1989, he felt impelled, faced with the economic problems and the enormous debt service ratio, to adopt a stabilization 27
The so-called Apertura, the enhanced opening of the Venezuelan oil industry to international private investment under favorable conditions with the aim of increasing oil production, especially in the new oil exploitation area of the Faja del Orinoco.
program, something which the IMF claimed was necessary. This program encompassed the deregulation of the exchange rate and a harsh cut in public expenditure (including the suspension of gasoline price subsidies) that triggered the uprising.
Political Institutions
The A further aspect concerning the political institutions of the country was that the partidocracia system, which during former decades had guaranteed stability, now contributed to blocking essential reforms and made the system inflexible (Corrales 2000: 136-138; Coppedge 1992: 37) . Once this system was in crisis, there hardly seemed to be a possibility of reform within it. 29 The existence of a link to the factor oil in this special case cannot be totally denied (as the specific configuration of the partidocracia system in Venezuela is not imaginable without the basis of the oil rents), but the influence of the oil rents should not be overestimated as it is rather a problem of the consequences of political pacts per se, something which can also occur in non-oil countries (Encarnación 2005: 182-203) . Another political aspect that could be regarded as a causal or rather reinforcing mechanism of the violent conflicts was the marginalization of leftist groups and their exclusion from politics, which encouraged the radicalization of several of them. Actually, some ultra left-wing groups figured in the military coup attempt of November 1992 (Traver/Frederick 2006: 143).
Behavioral Patterns of Political Actors
The careless conduct of President Andrés Pérez's government in 1989 additionally fuelled the conflicts (Romero 1996) . Immediately following an election campaign in which he exhaustively alluded to the "golden times" of his first presidency (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) , he implemented harsh austerity measures without having explained or even announced them to either the population or his party. Moreover, the government reacted to the 1989 protests by declaring a state of emergency and ordering excessively violent repression by the military forces. This deepened the loss of confidence in the political elite among large segments of the population.
Internal Violence since 2001. Violence as Part of Internal Conflicts
The role and importance of oil in the conflicts between the government of President Chávez and the political opposition is highly controversial. Nevertheless, there are various indications that the conflicts-especially in the first years of the Chávez government-were at least partly caused and intensified by the struggle for access to oil rents.
Resource Management: Distribution and Use of Oil Rents
One indication of the significance of oil within the conflicts could be the outstanding role of CTV and FEDECAMARAS within the strikes and protests. Both organizations were among the highly privileged actors (also in terms of rent distribution) of the former clientelistic system and they were explicit losers in the changed context of the Chávez government as they had to face re-distributional politics on the part of the new government (Dunning 2008: 175) .
In 
External Use of Resource Rents
The offensive external use of oil rents can be regarded as a further indirect, external resourcespecific contextual condition triggering the existent conflictivity. The Chávez government uses a significant amount of the oil revenues 31 to support "friendly" governments and political activists, 32 and thereby intends to disseminate the political ideology of the "Bolivarian Revolution" and expand the regional and international influence of the country. 33 These "friendly" governments include, among others, Cuba and Iran-countries that are internationally isolated and classified as rogue states by the United States. Consequently, these international contacts create an intended, international and regional polarization and have resulted in a very critical attitude on the part of many states towards the Venezuelan government. Nevertheless, this clearly existent polarization has so far not turned into violent bilateral conflict. 34 Still, the international "oil gifts" are also reinforcing internal conflictivity; for example, when the opposition attacks the president for squandering national wealth and not 30 There also was an external (resource-specific) influence, which was the backing of the strike by the transnational oil companies (e.g., Exxon Mobil, Shell and BP). employing it to the benefit of the Venezuelan population. This aspect is surely not the most relevant motive for the (violent) conflicts; it is, however, quite a common reproach of the opposition in Venezuela.
Although all in all there are serious indications that oil has had an influence on the increased level of violence since 2001 through the transmission channels presented here, it is obviously not the only explanatory factor.
Behavioral Patterns of Political Actors: The New and the Old Political Elite
With the presidency of Hugo Chávez, a profound transformation of the elite has taken place in Venezuela (Maihold 2008: 195) . The old political elite has been removed from political office and, preponderantly, from public administration. As described above, this implies deprivation from sovereignty over the distribution of oil rents, but even if socioeconomic factors and especially oil play an important role in Venezuelan politics, the question of political
power cannot be reduced to the direct and indirect influence of oil. The existing conflicts also have to be interpreted more generally as a struggle over political power between the old and new political elite. The former willingness to compromise (increasingly perverted by corruption and clientelism) has been superseded by an implacable antagonism between government and the opposition. The conduct and discourse of both the new and the old political elite are marked by severe partiality, mutual defamation, and black-and-white perspectives, all of which are clearly promoting the conflicts. In particular, President Chávez deliberately stirs up feelings when he insults the internal opposition, the multinational oil companies, or the United States (López Maya 2007: 190) . But parts of the opposition are also fomenting the violent conflicts by clearly exhibiting uncompromising and undemocratic dispositions (Gratius 2007) .
Political Ideas and Ideologies
Political-ideological factors are a further cause of the increased level of internal conflict.
These factors can be roughly summarized using the keywords "defense of democracy." It is certainly not always possible to easily identify whether the fear of an anti-democratic regression really is the motive for conflict or if it is just exploited to legitimate (internally as well as on the international stage) the opposition. Obviously both aspects are existent and vary depending on the particular segment of the opposition, which as a whole is quite heterogeneous. While it is not possible to realize a sophisticated analysis which distinguishes between the particular groups and actors in the context of this paper, it can be assumed that coming from the traditional corporate organizations, namely, CTV and FEDECAMARAS-which benefited heavily from the former distribution of the oil rents and have exhibited a sometimes not very democratic attitude as opposition actors-the argument of defending democratic values is less convincing.
Other opposition groups, for instance, parts of the student protest groups, indeed seem to be primarily driven by political motives. A fact that can be underlined by, among other things, their massive protests against the closure of the RCTV television station and in the context of the constitutional reform referendum in December 2007 (Werz 2007) . In both cases the government's actions clearly had a political impact, constraining democratic rights. Other groups of the opposition demonstrate varying, more particular motives, which may partly include political goals. For example, the initial mass protests against the Chávez government at the beginning of 2001 were triggered by the educational reform, which reduced the influence of private schools and implemented new teaching units such as basic pre-military training for children (Penfold 2006: 15) .
Economic Factors beyond the Oil Sector
Despite being of secondary importance, there are other socioeconomic factors which go beyond the oil sector boosting conflict between the government and opposition groups. These While the above-mentioned contextual conditions are first and foremost motives explaining, in general, the increase in internal conflictivity in recent years, the following factors particularly account for the violent nature of these clashes of interest.
Political Institutions
The decline of the traditional political parties and the partidocracia system which began in the To summarize, at least during the first years of the Chávez government, the actions of the United States contributed to an intensification of the Venezuelan government's confrontational internal and international behavior. Nevertheless, the two countries remain highly interdependent in economic terms. This fact has clearly helped to impede, so far, an escalation of the bilateral conflicts and casts doubt on the seriousness of President Chávez's threats to stop selling oil to the US (Sullivan 2008: 44) .
Causal Mechanisms Explaining the Increase in Repression
As a start, it must be repeated that the level of openly violent state repression is increasing but is not overwhelming. Thus, this analysis deals mainly with the causes of political and social restrictions; threats of violence; and a potential future increase in violent repression, as 36 For example, the funding of the NGO Súmate, which was involved in initiating the recall referendum. Furthermore, the US government has funded the workers' union CTV. The political organizations were financed through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED); as early as 1999 Venezuela was "ranked the highest of eleven countries in the region for NED-funded programs" (Clement 2007: 191) .
structural conditions have indeed been laid in this direction. The causal mechanisms here are partly identical to the causal mechanisms explaining the increase in internal conflicts presented above; nevertheless, there are also independent explanatory variables. These shall be primarily addressed in the following section.
Oil Abundance and Resource Management
As the oil price increased, reaching a peak of US$147 per barrel in summer 2008, the Venezuelan government had an enormous amount of extra income. In the year 2007 this meant around US$50 billion total oil-export earnings. The money was partly spent on an arms build-up. While the obtainable official data on military spending allude to this trend (Table 4) , the effective increase in international arms purchases by the Venezuelan government in recent years is estimated to be even higher. 37 Since the imposition of an arms embargo by the United States, Venezuela has primarily been purchasing weapons from Russia and, to a lower extent, from Spain, and is planning to expand its weapons trade with China. This choice of trade partners make the increase in military expenditures a particularly explosive geopolitical issue.
Nevertheless, the poor status of the Venezuelan military forces also has to be taken into consideration (Bromley/Perdomo 2005: 13) , as does the fact that Venezuelan weapons purchases are still less extensive than those of Brazil, Chile, or Colombia (Maihold, G. 2008: 14) . In an international comparison they are actually well below the average. According to authors such as Michael Ross, the build-up of arms can be used for violent political repression (Ross 2001; Karl 2007 ). As demonstrated above, this cannot be automatically presumed and has so far not occurred on a large scale in Venezuela. Nevertheless, there has been an obvious increase in the potential for this to happen, if it were to be considered necessary by the government.
37 Venezuela has spent "more than $3 billion in arms purchases from Russia over the past two years [2006] [2007] .
[…] This includes contracts to buy 24 Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets, 50 military helicopters, 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles, a license to build a factory to produce Kalashnikov rifles in Venezuela, and several submarines" (Sullivan 2008: 40; 49) .
Political Culture and the Behavioral Patterns of Political Actors
Oil is by far not the only factor explaining the repressionist tendencies of the current Venezuelan government. Another reason is the highly polarized political culture described above, 
Political Institutions
The decline of the partidocracia system as well as the political reforms of the Chávez government (see above) not only hampered conflict settlement within established political institutions but also fostered the personalization of politics and the centralization of power in the hands of the president. Through a process of reciprocal entanglement, this personalization and the increasing intransparency of political decision-making processes is providing fertile ground for autocratic (violent) political behaviour.
Relations with Neighboring Countries and Regional and Great Powers
On the one hand, the previously mentioned US support of opposition groups, the potential US support of the 2002 coup d'état, and the alleged threat of a US invasion have served to legitimate the expansion of military actors' influence in politics (Maihold 2008: 13) . They have also allowed the new Venezuelan government to justify repressive measures such as restrictions on NGOs or aggression against certain critics-whom it accuses of collaboration with "US imperialism."
On the other hand, Russia, China and Spain, which are the countries providing Venezuela with an increased weapons reservoir, also have a certain degree of influence. The Russian influence is more far-reaching: the Russian government is backing the Venezuelan government because of geopolitical and economic concerns, and both countries have intensified their bi-lateral relations in recent years. So far, this cooperation has not had a direct influence on repression in Venezuela, but it is a form of indirect support for the Chávez government, which could become more relevant in the event of further autocratic regression in Venezuela. Russian support could alleviate international isolation or potential sanctions against Venezuela.
The intensified bilateral relationship is, moreover, generally increasing the international importance and power of the Venezuelan government.
Finally, Cuba and Fidel Castro have exerted both a direct and indirect influence on the recent political developments in Venezuela: Firstly, numerous Cuban medical professionals and teachers are working in Venezuela in return for the supply of large amounts of oil to Cuba.
Secondly, President Chávez has announced on various occasions that he admires Fidel Castro. At least some of his politics and socialist ideas can clearly be attributed to his ideological affinity with the Cuban leader (Gratius 2005: 4) .
Interplay of Resource-specific and Non-resource-specific Contextual Conditions and
Internal Dynamics
It can be concluded that the reasons for the increase in violence in Venezuela consist of a complex interplay of various causal mechanisms. The impact and relative importance of the factor oil is much more obvious for the period at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s than for the period since 2001. Especially with respect to actual repression in Venezuela, the influence of oil seems to be of low importance and rather indirect-merely through the erosion of political institutions.
A major cause of internal violent conflict-mainly at the end of the 1980s but also at the beginning of Chávez's presidency-has been socioeconomic factors. In the first period the indirect impact of oil abundance-that is, a significant loss of abundance-and the indirect economic distortions of the oil economy were of central importance. In contrast, in the more recent period-a period of gradually rising oil prices-oil has driven internal violence through a different mechanism: here distributional disputes over oil rents have played a substantial role and have driven an intensification of the ongoing conflicts. In addition, the performance of political institutions and the behavioral patterns of elites played a considerable role in the first period of conflict. The elites' behavioral patterns in particular operated basically independently from the aspect of oil.
External factors were of high relevance during the first period due to the development of the international oil price and the consequential decrease in oil wealth. An additional external factor, or rather the absence of this factor, was also of some importance: the vanishing intervention of the US governments, which had contributed to the internal stability of Venezuela in the 1960s. 38 The influence of external contextual conditions on the recent increase in violence is clearly less important than internal factors. Nevertheless, external factors such as the 38 Although partly with the aid of quite suspect measures as far as democratic principles are concerned.
influence of the great powers-namely, the US and Russia, as well as international oil companies-should not be totally underestimated (nor should the indirect influence, as the Venezuelan government has instrumentalized this aspect of a potential external threat to legitimate certain internal reforms).
While political-ideological factors did not play a considerable role during the first period of conflict, they have had some influence in the second period. 
Conclusion
In sum, it can be concluded that oil in interaction with fluctuating non-resource-specific contextual conditions has in Venezuela both stabilized political rule and triggered conflict and violence.
Mainly by means of multidimensional distribution systems, oil contributed to the successful democratization and internal pacification processes in the 1960s; in addition, oil abundance also helped to consolidate "authoritarian peace" under General Vicente Gómez and has to some degree "sweetened" the recent authoritarian tendencies in the country.
Nonetheless, oil-in interplay with other major factors-has also been one of the causes of a (moderate) increase in violence in the country. With respect to the relative importance of the particular causal mechanisms, the impact of oil on violent conflictivity functions principally through socioeconomic channels: on the one hand, indirect mechanisms resulting from the decline of oil abundance, the specific resource-management approach, and economic distortions have been at work; on the other hand, more recent conflicts have been intensified by the motive of control over resource revenues-regardless of the development of the oil price. Of additional, but rather subordinate, importance appears to be the indirect impact of oil through the long-term degradation of political institutions due to clientelism and corruption.
Clientelism and corruption initially had a politically stabilizing effect, but in the long run they have deepened the delegitimization of the traditional political elite and thereby triggered conflicts. Hence, the rentier state theory's assumption that oil rents foster patronage networks, clientelism and assistentialist distribution policies clearly applies to the case of Venezuela. However, the consequences with reference to internal stability versus violent conflictivity are not as unambiguous as predicted by these authors: the inherent dynamism of the impact of corruption-short-term versus long-term impact and variable socialpsychological implications -has to be taken into consideration.
It has been demonstrated that oil is one of the causes of violent conflicts, but oil alone by no means sufficiently accounts for the violent conflicts and, even more so, the different dimensions of violence. Indeed, the contemporaneous repressive tendencies (that is, no directly violent repression) can be explained only marginally by the factor of oil.
Seen from a comparative-historical perspective, the impact of non-resource-specific contextual conditions on contemporary internal violence in Venezuela seems to now be more important than during the previous period of conflict at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. These conditions are primarily the behavioral patterns of elites, politicalideological factors, political institutions, and aspects of general political power. A more precise differentiation between the different groups of actors participating in the conflict has also proven to be necessary for further research.
The results explicitly underline the crucial importance of specific contextual factors and their interplay, and thereby contribute to the further differentiation of the present academic debate on oil and violence. Based on this paper, further research will be undertaken to test, and then 
